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Abstract:  We test the hypothesis that arbitrageurs amplify economic shocks in equity markets. 
 The ability of speculators to hold short positions depends on asset values:  shorts are often 
reduced following good news about a stock.  Therefore, the prices of highly shorted stocks are 
excessively sensitive to shocks compared to stocks with little short interest.  We confirm this 
hypothesis using several empirical strategies including two quasi-experiments.  In particular, we 
establish that the price of highly shorted stocks overshoots after good earnings news due to short 
covering compared to other stocks.   
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 1. Introduction 
We examine whether arbitrageurs amplify exogenous economic shocks in asset markets.  
This issue is related to a large literature dating back to Friedman (1953) on the role of 
speculators in affecting asset price dynamics.  A number of theories suggest that asset prices are 
excessively sensitive to economic news when arbitrage is limited in various ways such as 
leverage constraints or agency problems arising from delegated money management.1  For 
instance, the market turmoil of 1998 is widely viewed as having been exacerbated by the forced 
selling of assets by Long Term Capital Management and other hedge funds that were pursuing 
similar strategies.  The turbulence in the summer of 2007 has been attributed to the forced selling 
by many multi-strategy quantitative funds.2  And throughout the current crisis since the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, many market observers have pointed to the forced 
unwinding of highly-levered trades as an explanation for the collapse and extreme volatility of 
financial markets.3   
Despite the wide acknowledgment of the importance of this amplification mechanism in 
financial markets, there is relatively little systematic evidence on whether fundamental shocks 
are magnified by such speculative activity.  An understanding of the effects of speculators on 
asset price dynamics has never been more important from both academic and public policy 
perspectives.   
                                                 
1 A few examples include Delong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990); Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Kyle and 
Xiong (2001); and Gromb and Vayanos (2002). 
2 See, for example, Khandani and Lo (2008). 
3 For example, Reuters Newswire reported on October 24, 2008:  “The manager of the world's biggest bond fund 
said on Friday that forced liquidations, based on margin calls, are driving stocks lower, and not fear.  Bill Gross, 
chief investment officer of Pacific Investment Management Co. or Pimco, said on CNBC television that margin calls 
were driving the selling that has resulted in a long-term deleveraging of assets not seen since the 1930s.”  Echoing 
this theme, Jim Rogers in an interview with the Financial Times on November 17th, 2008 said: “A forced liquidation 
like we are now experiencing has occurred only 8 or 9 times in the past 150 years.” 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=967751
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We tackle this issue in the context of short arbitrage in equity markets by examining if 
the presence of short arbitrage in a stock heightens the reaction of its price to quarterly earnings 
news.  There are a couple of reasons why short selling in equity markets is a useful setting to 
study this issue.  First, there are plentiful panel data on the amount of short selling, and most 
short sales are undertaken by professional speculators such as hedge funds as opposed to retail 
investors.  This stands in contrast to the difficulty of measuring levered long speculative 
positions in equities.  Second, in practice, the ability of arbitrageurs to hold on to short positions 
depends on asset values: shorts are often reduced (increased) following good (bad) news about a 
stock for a variety of reasons.  This has been confirmed by earlier work on this mechanism (see, 
e.g., Lamont and Stein (2004)).  Short sales tend to be highly levered transactions that require 
having enough funds in the margin account.     
Indeed, the financial press often speaks of “short covering” (the cutting down of short 
positions through the purchase of shares) causing excess volatility in markets.  One example is 
for the internet stock eBay, which reported better earnings than expected in the summer of 2005.  
Its stock price soared dramatically the same day.  The press pointed to short covering as a likely 
source of the price movement (see Nassar (2005)).  More recently, on October 28, 2008, hedge 
funds shorting the car maker Volkswagen (VW) were forced to cover their short positions when 
news came out that Porsche had bought up much of VW's remaining free float.  Shares in the 
German car maker, that began the day trading at €420 a share hit an intraday high of €1,005.01, 
valuing the company at €296.06 billion euros ($370.4 billion) based on ordinary stock:  more 
than that of the world’s next largest company at the time Exxon Mobil Corp's $343 billion 
market value.  VW’s share price reverted to €393 per share by November 3rd after the hedge 
funds finished buying all the shares they needed to cover their speculative positions. 
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To capture this amplification mechanism caused by short covering, we begin by 
developing a simple three date model, based on Shleifer and Vishny (1997), of asset price 
dynamics in which arbitrageurs have a profitable opportunity to short an over-priced stock 
subject to positive sentiment.4  The key ingredient is that the ability of arbitrageurs to hold on to 
short positions depends on asset values (i.e., the past performance of these positions).  There is 
also an earnings announcement that may affect the sentiment for the stock.  Our joint hypothesis 
is as follows:  Suppose the firm has good earnings news, forcing arbitrageurs to short cover.  
This short covering will temporarily boost a firm’s stock price as the extra buying pressure leads 
to an overshooting of price to earnings news that is reversed in the long run. 
We derive three key predictions that we test using monthly data on short sales in U.S. 
equities from 1994 to 2007.  The first prediction is that the price sensitivity to earnings news is 
higher for a stock with positive short selling (i.e., arbitrage presence) than for a stock with no 
short selling (i.e., no arbitrageurs).  We measure the sensitivity of the stock price to earnings 
news as the regression coefficient of the stock return around the earnings announcement date on 
the earnings surprise (or the difference between the earnings and the consensus forecast scaled 
by previous price).  We define a highly shorted stock as one in the top 33% of the short ratio 
(short interest to shares outstanding) distribution for stocks in our sample for that quarter and a 
stock with little short selling as the rest of the stocks in our sample for that quarter.  The premise 
behind this cutoff is that only those with substantial short ratios are likely to be subject to 
genuine valuation-motivated arbitrage activity. 
                                                 
4 Our short-selling set-up is consistent with empirical studies on the source of short seller profits.  Dechow et.al. 
(2001) and D’avolio (2002) argue that the source of profits for short sellers is that they short mis-priced stocks:  
short sales increase with price-to-earnings ratios, and short sellers cover as the mis-pricing corrects (i.e. as price 
converges towards earnings). 
4 
 
We test this prediction by running a pooled regression of cumulative abnormal returns 
around (quarterly) earnings announcement dates (from one trading day before to one day after) 
on a high earnings surprise dummy variable (equal to one if the stock is in the top 33% of the 
earnings surprise distribution for stocks in our sample for that quarter and zero otherwise), a 
dummy variable for whether a stock is highly shorted before the earnings date and the highly 
shorted dummy interacted with the high earnings surprise dummy.  The coefficient for the 
interaction term then tells us the difference in the sensitivity of the stock price to news between 
highly shorted stocks and stocks with little short interest.  
In estimating this relation, we worry about unobserved heterogeneity:  e.g., highly 
shorted stocks may be more in the “media spotlight” than other stocks and hence their prices 
respond more to news.  To deal with this issue, we estimate this regression specification (and 
indeed all the other specifications below) in a variety of ways such as controlling for a number of 
stock characteristics (e.g. interacting news with stock characteristics such as firm size and 
institutional ownership) and using stock fixed effects.  Regardless of how we estimate this 
relation, we find that the price of a highly shorted stock is more sensitive to earnings news than a 
stock with little shorting.  For stocks with little short interest, our basic results suggest that 
having a high earnings surprise leads to a higher cumulative abnormal return of about 3.27 
percentage points (or 327 basis points).  In contrast, for highly shorted stocks, the comparable 
figure is around 382 percentage points.  The difference of 55 basis points (about 17% larger for 
highly shorted stocks) is economically and statistically significant.  We verify that this relation 
(as well as all the other ones established below) is robust to a variety of different specification 
checks such as ways of measuring abnormal returns and earnings surprises.   
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The second prediction is that the change in the short interest ratio of a stock should be 
negatively correlated with the earnings surprise (e.g., a positive earnings surprise should lead to a 
fall in this ratio).  Here, we are merely extending earlier work by Lamont and Stein (2004) and 
Savor and Gamboa-Cavazos (2005); they have already shown that the monthly short interest 
ratio falls on good news to stock prices and rises on bad news to stock prices.  Ideally, we want 
to measure the sensitivity of changes in daily short interest to unexpected earnings 
announcements; unfortunately, we can only observe short interest at a monthly frequency.  As 
we discuss below, such monthly changes are a noisy and likely biased way to pick up the short 
covering effect around earnings dates.  Therefore, we use a stock’s abnormal turnover around the 
earnings announcement as a proxy for changes in the short interest ratio. Consistent with our 
model, we find that for highly shorted stocks, abnormal turnover is more sensitive to earnings 
news than for little shorted stocks.5  
Our third and perhaps most important prediction is that arbitrageurs are forced to cover 
short positions that would have been profitable; i.e., the stock price subsequently declines.  This 
means that for highly shorted stocks, a short position initiated after the event date should be more 
profitable after good earnings news forces short covering.  We find that for stocks with little 
shorting, good news leads to higher subsequent returns (from 2 days after to 126 trading days 
after the announcement) to holding the stock (about 157 basis points).  This is consistent with the 
well-documented post earnings announcement drift (see, e.g., Bernard and Thomas (1989, 
1990)).  However, for highly shorted stocks, good news leads to excess returns of negative 110 
basis points:  267 basis points lower than for little shorted stocks.  In other words, a short 
position in these stocks initiated after good earnings news is profitable.   
                                                 
5 These findings control for level differences in turnover between highly-shorted stocks and other stocks.  Consistent 
with our model, highly-shorted stocks have higher turnover than other stocks.  However, this could also be 
consistent with other asset pricing models without our effects. 
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It is this third prediction that cuts strongly against a number of alternative stories.  For 
instance, one possible reason for price being more sensitive to news for highly shorted stocks is 
that short sales are informed bets that there are going to be negative earnings surprises.  As a 
result, good news means these bets are wrong and price naturally reacts more to good news.  If 
this alternative explanation is correct, then one would not expect to find that the greater price 
increase observed on the event date following good news is subsequently reversed (i.e., that the 
stock price declines in the months following the good news).  This post-announcement return 
finding is difficult to reconcile with alternative explanations.   
Finally, to better identify our amplification mechanism, we consider two quasi-
experiments.  Our first quasi-experiment is that the above findings ought to be stronger for 
NASDAQ stocks than NYSE stocks because historically it was easier to short NASDAQ stocks 
than NYSE stocks for regulatory reasons before 2007 (and particularly before 2001).  We find 
empirical support for our hypothesis using this quasi-experiment.  Our second quasi-experiment 
builds on the work of Hanson and Sunderam (2008), who show a striking increase in the short 
interest ratio since the early 2000s concentrated among small stocks.  They argue that this is due 
to the rise of hedge funds.  If our hypothesis is correct, then we expect to find that the 
destabilizing effects shown above ought to have increased among small stocks since 2002 
compared to large stocks that did not witness such growth.  Although our estimates are 
imprecise, we find that this is indeed the case.   
There is a growing literature testing the implications of limits to arbitrage models.  Work 
most closely related to ours includes Savor and Gamboa-Cavazos (2005), who find that short 
sellers cover their positions after suffering losses and increase them after experiencing gains 
(measured using past returns).  This relation is very strong for positions established due to 
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perceived overvaluation; expected returns do not explain the documented short seller behavior.  
Similarly, Lamont and Stein (2004) show a strong negative correlation between market returns 
and the change in the aggregate short interest ratio.   
The main innovation of our paper relative to these and other empirical papers in the 
literature is that we show that arbitrage activity directly influences asset prices through at least 
one channel:  the amplification of fundamental shocks.6  The important point is that this paper is 
one of the first to directly show the economic mechanism that leads to destabilizing speculation 
in asset markets.7  However, the idea that short sales can influence stock price reaction to news is 
also in Reed (2007), who shows that short-sales constraints lead price to under-react to bad 
earnings news.  We show in contrast that stock prices over-react to good news due to short 
covering. 
Our paper is also closely related to empirical papers looking at the relation between 
leverage and asset prices.8  Lamont and Stein (1999) test a similar hypothesis to ours but in the 
context of the housing market.  Their principal finding is that in cities where a greater fraction of 
homeowners are highly leveraged, house prices react more sensitively to city-specific shocks 
such as changes in per capita income.  In contrast to their paper, our setting provides a tighter test 
of the amplification-of-fundamental-shocks hypothesis. 
                                                 
6 Other recent examples related to testing limits of arbitrage models include Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), who 
examine the holdings of certain hedge funds during the Internet bubble and Gabaix, Krishnamurthy and Vigneron 
(2007), who argue that prices of mortgage-backed securities are determined by specialized arbitrageurs. 
7 We do not take a stand on why short arbitrageurs cut their positions following good news.  We have naturally 
framed this short covering in terms of leverage, risk management or more general agency issues, but it could very 
well be due to other factors such as behavioral biases that lead arbitrageurs to cut their losses.   
8 This leverage mechanism has been pointed out in a number of other settings including stocks (Garbade (1982)), 
corporate asset sales (Shleifer and Vishny (1992)), land (Kashyap, Scharfstein and Weil (1990)); Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997)) and housing (Stein (1995)). 
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Our paper proceeds as follows.  We present a simple model to derive the main predictions 
in Section 2.  The data is presented in Section 3 and the empirical findings in Section 4.  We 
conclude in Section 5.  All proofs are in the Appendix. 
 
2. Model 
This section presents a simple three-period model based on Shleifer and Vishny (1997).  
Whereas Shleifer and Vishny (1997) look at levered longs by arbitrageurs in an initially under-
priced stock, we consider the case of arbitrageurs shorting an initially over-priced stock.  The 
model illustrates how an informed arbitrageur faced with leverage and/or risk management 
constraints must cut back on positions following adverse price moves and that such actions tend 
to amplify the price reaction to an economic shock. 
There is a single asset (the stock) available in unit net supply.  There are three dates 
numbered 0, 1, and 2.  At date 2, the asset is liquidated with payoff v , which may take on the 
value v  or v  with equal chance.  At date 1, the value of v  is announced to all.  We denote the 
price at time t  by tp .   
There are two sets of agents in the economy: noise traders and risk neutral rational 
speculators (e.g., hedge funds).  The noise traders over-estimate the fundamental payoff by an 
amount 0S at time 0.  This sentiment (optimism) may widen or narrow to )(vS at time 1 
(depending on the nature of the earnings announcement) and disappears completely by time 2.  
More formally, we assume that aggregate noise trader demands at time 0 and 1 are given by (in 
share terms) 
 
00
0
0
2
1
2
1
p
Svv
p
SvEQ N

                (1) 
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and 
     
11
1
1 p
vSv
p
vSvEQN                    (2) 
respectively. 
Arbitrageurs undertake short positions to partially counteract the noise traders, but we 
assume their resources in the two periods, given by 0F  and )(1 vF , are insufficient to bring prices 
to fundamental value.  For simplicity, initial aggregate speculator demand is given by 
0
0
0 p
F
Q S          (3) 
where SF 0 .  (In the Appendix, we solve the more general model in which arbitrageurs can 
determine how much of their resources ( 00 FD  ) to invest at time 0.  The remainder is invested 
in cash and yields a zero net return as a safeguard against running out of funds at time 1.)  At 
time 1, all uncertainty has been resolved and speculators take the maximum possible short 
position, yielding a demand of 
1
1
1 p
FQ S          (4) 
provided )()(1 vSvF  .  Due to the unit net supply assumption, the short demand of speculators 
in this model is also the short ratio or the ratio of shares shorted to total shares outstanding. 
We also make the following assumption regarding the time evolution of the arbitrageurs’ 
resources  
   


 
0
1
001 1 p
vpaFFvF ,     (5) 
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where 1a .  If the arbitrageurs do not short at time 0, then F1 v  F0 .  But since they are 
assumed to short an amount F0, their capital at time 1 depends on the return of shorting, 
1 p1 v 
p0



, between time 0 and 1.  How sensitive their resources are at time 1 to asset values or 
past returns (i.e. their ability to hold on to shorts) is given by the parameter a .  We do not take a 
stand as to why 1a .  Most naturally, it reflects the fact that short sellers tend to be levered.  
Also plausibly, it may be an internal risk management control, or it might be imposed on the 
speculators by fund inflows and outflows from outside investors (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).  
For instance, one interpretation is that there are loss-limits at the position level or related value-
at-risk (VAR) considerations and, when a short position suffers a loss, the position is 
dramatically cut back.    (Plentiful anecdotal evidence (cited in the Introduction) seems to bear 
this assumption out.)  
We now solve for the asset prices.  Date 2 represents the long-run in which price reverts 
to fundamental value; i.e. by no arbitrage, vp 2 .  Because aggregate demand in each period 
must equal the unit supply, i.e., 
1 NtSt QQ ,      (6) 
price at time 0 is 
00 2
1
2
1 FSvvp  .      (7) 
Equating supply and demand at time 1 and then substituting from equation (5), we get 
   
0
0
0
1
1
)1(
p
Fa
aFvSvvp

  .     (8) 
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Finally, we introduce an important variable for our empirical work.  This variable, the 
sensitivity of stock price to earnings news (often called the earnings response coefficient) 
denoted by , is: 
 
][
01
0
0
vEv
pp
p
v
p
p
v 


       (9) 
It represents the responsiveness of price to innovations in fundamental value.  Higher values of 
  denote higher sensitivity of prices to news.  Alternatively, we can also scale the earnings 
innovations by the expectation of earnings.  The theoretical results are similar and so we stay 
with the definition in equation (9) because it is the one most often used in papers that measure 
the sensitivity of price to earnings news. 
The following three propositions are the key predictions of the model that we test.  For all 
three propositions, we are assuming that there is not enough capital to bring prices close to 
fundamental value. 
 
Proposition 1:  The sensitivity of stock price to earnings news, , is greater for heavily shorted 
stocks than for little shorted stocks. 
 
The key amplifying mechanism is that the ability of arbitrageurs to maintain their 
positions is tied to asset values.  The effect is similar to that of leverage constraints for long 
positions.9    
                                                 
9 Although this model is very stylized, it is possible to perform some back of the envelope calculations to gauge the 
differential in sensitivity of price to news between highly shorted compared to little shorted stocks (the details of 
these calculations are available upon request from the authors).  The upshot is that the results are sensitive to the 
unobservable parameter a (the amplification parameter) and the differential sensitivity can vary between being 10% 
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 The second proposition is that the change in the short interest ratio of a stock should be 
negatively correlated with the earnings surprise (i.e., a positive earnings surprise should lead to a 
drop in the short ratio).  Unfortunately, our monthly short interest data is too coarse to capture 
this short covering effect around earnings announcements, particularly in light of the findings in 
Diether, Lee and Werner (2009).  Due to our inability to measure daily short covering, we show 
that this short covering effect translates into abnormal turnover being more sensitive to 
unexpected earnings for highly shorted stocks than little shorted stocks.  
 
Proposition 2: For shorted stocks, the change in the short ratio is inversely related to the 
earnings surprise, and share turnover around earnings announcements is more sensitive to (the 
absolute value of) unexpected earnings for highly shorted stocks than for little shorted stocks. 
 
It is the latter implication of this proposition that we focus on in our empirical work; that is, we 
test that turnover is more sensitive to (the absolute value of) unexpected earnings news for 
shorted stocks.  
Finally, the premise of the amplification mechanism is that arbitrageurs are forced to get 
out of profitable short positions.  Proposition 3 formalizes this premise by allowing sentiment to 
rise even after good news so that the short position remains profitable.  This is a modeling device 
meant to capture the fact that short positions may be fundamentally profitable but arbitrageurs 
may have difficulty hanging on to short positions if their ability to do so depends on asset values.  
In a more dynamic set-up with multiple earnings dates, we could also accomplish the same result 
by introducing transitory earnings shocks.  
                                                                                                                                                             
to 30% greater for highly shorted stocks (assuming a mean short ratio of 8%, which is roughly what we see in the 
data) depending on what one assumes about this parameter.  Our empirical estimates fall comfortably within this 
wide range of calibration magnitudes. 
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Proposition 3: If sentiment increases proportionally with unexpected earnings news, then for 
highly shorted stocks, the buying pressure from short covering could push the price 
to above fundamental value and the expected return to shorting is higher after a good earnings 
surprise. 
 
We test Proposition 3 by comparing subsequent stock returns after earnings announcements for 
highly shorted stocks to little shorted stocks.  The only caveat in testing Proposition 3 is that 
there is the well-documented post earnings announcement drift in the data; i.e., stocks with good 
or bad news continue to drift in the direction of the news after the announcement (see, e.g., 
Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990)).  We do not model post earnings announcement drift in this 
paper, although we could by assuming a degree of under-reaction to news as in Barberis, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1998) or Hong and Stein (1999).  Therefore, we need to account for this drift in 
testing this proposition.  So, another way of posing this proposition is that there should be less 
post earnings announcement drift in highly shorted stocks compared to other stocks.  Positions 
that were unprofitable (with the positive earnings surprise) are profitable on a point forward 
basis. 
Also, according to our model, the sensitivities of stock prices and turnover to earnings 
surprises are symmetric with respect to good and bad news as indicated by Propositions 1 and 2.  
Naturally, good news leads to short covering and hence trading and the extra sensitivity of price 
to news.  Less obviously, the reason bad news also leads to trading is that we assume that short 
sellers are initially capital constrained; they would ideally like to short more than they can at 
time 0.  When there is bad news at time 1, their positions between 0 and 1 make money and this 
affords them more capital to take larger short positions at time 1, leading to extra turnover and 
14 
 
the extra sensitivity of price to news.  This effect is due to the symmetry of our performance-
based arbitrage assumption given by equation (5), which says that the arbitrageurs get more 
money when their positions do well.10  These predictions are sensitive to our assumption in 
equation (5), and one could imagine there being asymmetries in these reactions to news if 
arbitrageurs do not get more capital when their short positions do well.  This is largely an 
empirical question.   
Moreover, according to our model (Proposition 3), we should see over-shooting only on 
short covering with very good news.  With bad news, the shorts become more profitable between 
time 0 and 1 and so arbitrageurs do not have to abandon (and might even increase) their short 
positions at time 1.  In other words, we should see an asymmetry in the results for returns 
subsequent to the earnings announcement.  We test to see if there are indeed these patterns in the 
data. 
 
 3. Data 
The sample consists of quarterly observations of stocks that are listed on the 
NYSE/AMEX or NASDAQ exchanges from 1994 through 2007.  Observations are dropped if 
short interest, earnings data, or I/B/E/S forecast data are missing, or if the earnings statement 
takes place outside the typical earnings announcement season, which we consider to be 30 to 90 
calendar days following the end of the fiscal period.  All of our cutoff criteria described below 
are constructed based on this sample. 
Our data on monthly short interest, available for the period of 1994 to 2007, are obtained 
from Bloomberg and NASDAQ.  Each month’s short interest data represent positions that closed 
                                                 
10 This is consistent with Lamont and Stein (2004) and Savor and Gamboa-Cavazos (2005), which find that shorting 
also increases after poor market returns (or good returns to shorting stocks). 
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on the first business day on or after the 15th of the month.  We use this short interest information 
to construct short ratios for each month; we approximate the short ratio by dividing total short 
interest positions by shares outstanding (from CRSP) on this day each month.  We focus on 
extremes:  highly shorted stocks (the top 33% of the short ratio distribution for our sample in that 
quarter) compared to little shorted stocks (the rest of the stocks in our sample that quarter). 
Stocks in this range could be shorted for valuation reasons or for hedging reasons (see, e.g., 
Chen, Hong and Stein (2002); Asquith, Pathak and Ritter (2005)).  We believe this comparison is 
the cleanest way of identifying our effect.  More specifically, we define HISR as a dummy equal 
to one if the stock is in the top 33% of the short ratio distribution for stocks in our sample for the 
quarter of the observation and zero otherwise.  The top 33% cutoff is chosen because among this 
sub-group there is a relatively high short ratio (about 7.46% on average).  Our results are robust 
to using other cutoffs. 
We combine these data with information from three other databases.  First, quarterly 
earnings consensus estimates and actual initial (i.e. unadjusted) earnings releases are collected 
from the I/B/E/S summary files to calculate unexpected earnings (UE).  In practice, researchers 
have a few different ways of calculating unexpected earnings; usually UE is the difference 
between the actual quarterly earnings according to I/B/E/S and the consensus forecast provided 
by I/B/E/S in the last month before the announcement date scaled by either past price, previous 
earnings or the consensus forecast (see, e.g., Conrad, Cornell and Landsman (2002) and Kothari 
(2001)).  Here, like most of the literature, we scale UE by past price.  We define UEHIGH as a 
dummy variable equal to one if a stock’s earnings surprise is in the top 33% of the distribution of 
our data sample for that quarter and zero otherwise. 
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Second, data on daily holding period returns, prices, trading volume and shares 
outstanding are obtained from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP).  Using these 
data, we calculate cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcement dates using a 
methodology similar to Fama and French (1992) extended to include momentum: 


 1
0
1
0
,,
t
tj
j
t
tj
jiqi PORTRCAR                                                  (10) 
where jiR , is the percentage return on stock i on date j around the earnings announcement in 
quarter q.  The window to calculate the cumulative abnormal return begins at date 0t and ends at 
date 1t .  Similar to Fama and French (1992), we form 18 portfolios based on the intersection of 
two size-based groups, three book-to-market based groups and three momentum groups (using 
Fama-French cutoffs).  jPORT is the return on the benchmark size, book-to-market and 
momentum Fama-French-Carhart portfolio to which stock i belongs. 
 For our main results, we concentrate on two time windows relative to earnings 
announcements when calculating returns.  The first are returns cumulated over the 3-day window 
from one trading day before until one day after the earnings release date (CAR).  The second is 
the cumulative post-announcement returns (POSTCAR) using trading days +2 to +126 relative to 
earnings release.11  Using the CRSP database, we also calculate daily share turnover (using 
trading volume and shares outstanding).  To account for differences in how volume is computed 
for NASDAQ-listed firms relative to NYSE/AMEX-listed firms, we adjust NASDAQ volume 
using the procedure described in Gao and Ritter (2010).12 We then take the average of this 
                                                 
11 Because firms occasionally disappear from the CRSP database sometime during the 126 days we are using to 
calculate POSTCAR, we use as many days of returns that are provided (and the delisting return) to measure 
POSTCAR for these firms that leave the database. 
12 As in Gao and Ritter (2010), we divide the volume of NASDAQ listed firms for observations before February 1, 
2001 by 2.0.  For observations between February 1, 2001 and December 31, 2001, we divide volume of NASDAQ-
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adjusted daily share turnover from trading day -1 to day +1 surrounding the day 0 earnings 
announcement.  The timing is set to match that of the CAR.  We calculate abnormal turnover for 
a stock (ABNTURN) as this turnover around the announcement date minus the average turnover 
of the stock around all the announcement dates in the sample.   
Third, the following annual accounting variables are obtained from the 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged Industrial Annual data file: book equity (data item 60), convertible 
securities (data item 39), earnings per share (data item 57) and fiscal-year-end closing price (data 
item 199).  The price-to-earnings valuation ratio is calculated as the lagged price as of 21 days 
before earnings release divided by the previous year’s annual EPS. 
Finally, firm market capitalization is obtained from CRSP.  Monthly return volatility is 
calculated using daily return data from CRSP.  A measure of analyst disagreement, or the 
dispersion of analyst forecasts (calculated as in Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002)), is 
obtained from I/B/E/S.   
The summary statistics for these variables are presented in Table 1.  The key statistic is 
that the mean of the short ratio distribution is about 3.44% and its standard deviation is 4.80%.  
For stocks in the top 33% of the short ratio distribution, the mean is 7.46% as we mentioned 
earlier.   The statistics for the other variables are similar to those reported in other papers. 
 
 4. Empirical findings 
 4.1. Sensitivity of price to earnings news 
We begin by testing Proposition 1, which states that the earnings response coefficient 
should be higher for highly shorted stocks.  We want to measure how the sensitivity of price to 
                                                                                                                                                             
listed firms by 1.8.  For NASDAQ-listed observations during 2002 and 2003, we divide volume by 1.6; beyond 
2003 observations, no adjustment is made. 
18 
 
earnings news varies by whether a stock is actively shorted or not.  We first measure the overall 
effect of unexpected earnings shocks on returns:  i.e., the price to earnings sensitivity for the 
typical firm in our sample.  This will provide us with a benchmark.  To this end, we estimate the 
following specification: 
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The left-hand side (LHS) variable is CAR (cumulative abnormal return from trading day -1 to 
+1).  The right-hand side (RHS) variable of interest is UEHIGH, which equals one if a firm’s 
earnings surprise is in the top 33% of the earnings surprise distribution for stocks in our sample 
for that quarter and zero otherwise.  The other RHS variables include HISR (a dummy equal to 
one if the stock is in the top 33% of the short ratio distribution for stocks in our sample for the 
quarter of the observation and zero otherwise), SIZE (25 dummy variables measuring where a 
stock’s relative market cap is each quarter), P/E (price-to-earnings divided into 25 dummies by 
quarter and one additional dummy variable for negative earnings stocks), DISAGREEMENT (the 
dispersion in analyst forecasts divided into 25 dummies by quarter), CONVDEBT (a dummy for 
the firm having positive convertible debt), VOLATILITY (return volatility of firms in the previous 
month calculated using daily returns divided into 25 dummies by quarter), INDUSTRY dummies 
(SIC at the 2 digit level), EXCHANGE dummies and QUARTER dummies.  We will provide the 
rationale for each of these control variables as we build up to our specification of interest.13   
                                                 
13 We have also included the age of the firm in all of our cross-sectional regressions as a control and find similar 
results. 
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The result for this specification is reported in column (1) of Table 2.  As expected, the 
coefficient for UEHIGH is positive and statistically different from zero.  The coefficient implies 
that being in the high unexpected earnings group is associated with a 3.46% abnormal return of 
the stock (CAR).  This number is in line with other studies of the sensitivity of stock price to 
earnings surprises mentioned earlier.   
We then estimate the following model, which is the same as the previous one except for 
the addition of the interaction of UEHIGH and HISR: 
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The coefficient of interest is now 3 , which measures the differential sensitivity of 
highly shorted stocks to unexpected earnings compared to other stocks.  The result is reported in 
column (2).  The estimates show that the sensitivity to high unexpected earnings shocks is 
greater for high short ratio stocks.  1  suggests that for a low short ratio stock, having a high UE 
is associated with a 3.27 percentage point increase in CAR.  3  is 0.55 and statistically different 
from zero with a t-statistic of about 4.6.  So having a high UE increases CAR by 0.55 percentage 
points more for a high short ratio stock than a low short ratio stock.   3  suggests that the 
sensitivity of high short ratio stocks to unexpected earnings is about 0.55/3.27 = 17% greater 
than for low short ratio stocks. 
This regression specification controls for a number of stock characteristics, but these 
controls do not allow for the effect of news to vary by these stock characteristics.  Therefore, we 
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estimate the following model, which is the same as the previous one except for the addition of 
the interactions of UEHIGH with the other firm characteristics: 
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The coefficient of interest again is 3 , which measures the differential sensitivity of high short 
ratio shocks to unexpected earnings shocks.  We include the additional interactions of UEHIGH 
with the other control variables because price sensitivity to news might vary by the different 
characteristics.  For instance, the price of a high price-to-earnings stock might have a different 
sensitivity to earnings news than a low one.  Similarly, the price of a large capitalization stock 
might respond more to news than the price of a small capitalization stock if the investors in large 
stocks are more likely to be institutions and institutions pay closer attention to news compared to 
individuals.  We also add interactions of UEHIGH and DISAGREEMENT because highly shorted 
stocks may simply have more analyst dispersion and the price of high divergence of opinion 
stocks may react more to news.  The logic for institutional ownership and past volatility are 
similar.  For convertible debt, short interest might be driven by hedging trades associated with 
the purchase of convertible securities (see Asquith, Pathak and Ritter (2005)).  Because we want 
to measure short interest related to speculative trades as precisely as possible, we include a 
convertible debt by UEHIGH interaction. 
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The results from this estimation are presented in column (3).  3  is positive and 
statistically significant (0.33 with a t-statistic of about 2.5).  The estimate shows that the 
sensitivity to UE is greater for high short ratio stocks; for these stocks, the CAR is 0.33 
percentage points higher for having a high UE, similar in size to what we obtained in column (2).  
In contrast to the estimates in column (2), note that we cannot obtain a unique estimate of 1  in 
this specification because of all of the other interactions with UEHIGH; as a result, we cannot 
perform the same economic significance calculations as in column (2).  Hence, one can think of 
the estimate in column (3) as providing a robustness check.  
 In columns 4-6, we re-estimate the specifications in columns 1-3, except that we now 
include stock fixed effects.  The logic of this specification is that we are worried that even with 
all of our elaborate controls, there might still be fixed differences across stocks for which we 
have not yet accounted (e.g., some stocks are more in the spotlight in some un-measurable 
manner and these stocks attract both more shorts and react more to earnings surprises).  We 
obtain similar estimates compared to our previous specification.  The coefficient for UEHIGH in 
column (4) is 3.75 instead of 3.46 from column (1).  In column (5), the coefficient for the 
interaction of UEHIGH and HISR is 0.79, which is somewhat larger than the estimate of 0.55 in 
column (2).  Interacting UEHIGH with the other stock characteristics in column (6) does not 
substantially affect our estimate of 3 .  The comforting result here is that adding stock fixed 
effects strengthens our differential earnings surprise effect by around 40%. 
In columns 7-9, rather than including stock fixed effects, we allow for quarterly variation 
in the industry effects to account for potential time varying trends that might spuriously be 
generating our findings in columns 1-3.  For instance, the spotlight effect might change over time 
(some stocks are in the spotlight more at certain times).  If this spotlight effect is not specific to a 
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stock but is common across all stocks in the same industry, then our quarter by industry effects 
will control for any spurious relation generated by such a process.  Again, the estimates are 
similar to columns 1-3.  In column (7), the coefficient for UEHIGH is now 3.50 instead of 3.46 
in column (1).  In column (8), the coefficient for UEHIGHHISR is now 0.53 instead of 0.55.  
And the coefficient for UEHIGHHISR in column (9) is now 0.30 instead of 0.33.  All these 
estimates are again statistically and economically significant.   
 The findings in Table 2 help confirm the first prediction of our arbitrageur amplification 
hypothesis.  We have taken an “everything but the kitchen sink” approach in this table, including 
several stock characteristic controls in the regression specification to rule out alternative 
explanations.  However, an even better way to support our story is to test our model’s additional 
implications that do not arise naturally out of an omitted variable bias story; we consider tests of 
these implications next. 
 
4.2. Sensitivity of turnover to earnings news  
Now we test Proposition 2, which states that the sensitivity of volume to earnings 
announcements should be positively related to the short interest ratio.  We want to measure how 
the sensitivity of changes in short interest and turnover to earnings news varies by whether a 
stock is actively shorted or not.  In our context, we ideally want to observe daily changes in the 
short interest ratio around our earnings announcements to examine whether unexpected good 
news is correlated with a decrease in the daily short interest ratio.  However, we only have short 
ratio information at a monthly frequency.  So, it is likely that the daily decrease in short interest 
ratio we want to measure will be swamped by monthly changes in the short interest ratio caused 
by other factors.  Also, theory suggests that after certain hedge funds are forced to abandon their 
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short positions, the profitability of shorting goes up (as witnessed by our results below regarding 
the profitability of shorting previously highly shorted stocks with good earnings news).  Hence, 
there will be entry of short hedge funds or the establishment of new short positions after the 
earnings announcement and so we may see little change in the monthly short interest ratio.  
Indeed, this is the main finding of Diether, Lee and Werner (2009); they show that daily changes 
in short interest do not show up when aggregated to the monthly level.  As such, we turn to daily 
turnover as a rough proxy for daily changes in short interest. 
Our analysis proceeds in a manner similar to that of Table 2.  The results for abnormal 
turnover around earnings announcements are presented in Table 3; it is the equivalent of Table 2 
except that the dependent variable is ABNTURN, the abnormal (from trading day -1 to +1 around 
the earnings announcement) turnover of the stock, and UEHIGH is replaced by ABSUEHIGH the 
absolute vale of unexpected earnings, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the absolute 
value of the earnings surprise is in the top 33% of the ABSUE distribution for stocks in our 
sample for that quarter.  The reason we use ABSUEHIGH instead of UEHIGH is that either good 
or bad earnings news will lead to turnover according to our model.  Good news leads to 
additional transactions due to short covering, while bad news leads to additional short selling on 
the part of (initially constrained) speculators. 
Columns 1-9 of Table 3 are analogous to those in Table 2.  Column (1) shows that higher 
absolute UE increases turnover.  Having high absolute UE increases turnover by about 0.130 
percentage points (about 9% of a standard deviation of abnormal turnover).   Column (2) shows 
that this sensitivity is greater for highly shorted stocks.  3  is positive and statistically different 
from zero (.075 with a t-statistic of about 3.3).  For little shorted stocks, the sensitivity of 
turnover to ABSUEHIGH is 0.104 percentage points.  In contrast, the sensitivity for highly 
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shorted stocks is 0.179 (0.104+0.075) percentage points, which is about 70% bigger than the 
magnitude for low-short-ratio stocks.  Column (3), which adds as controls interactions of 
ABSUEHIGH with other stock characteristics, slightly strengthens the results of column 2.14   
In columns 4-6, we present the results including stock fixed effects in the regression 
specification.  Column (4) shows that having a high absolute UE measure increases turnover by 
0.130 percentage points.  Column (5) indicates that for little shorted stocks, having high absolute 
UE raises turnover by 0.090 percentage points.   3  from column (5) is positive and statistically 
significant (0.111 with a t-statistic of about 4.3).  The economic effect is large; for highly shorted 
stocks, the sensitivity of turnover to an absolute earnings surprise is about 120% larger than for 
little shorted stocks, indicating that the relative effect is even larger when we estimate with stock 
fixed effects.  The results using quarter by industry effects (presented in columns 7-9) are similar 
to columns 1-3.  In sum, these results are broadly consistent with the second prediction of our 
model.  This finding suggests that any alternative story for our first finding regarding highly 
shorted stocks having a greater sensitivity to news must also explain why abnormal turnover in 
highly shorted stocks is more sensitive to news. 
 
 4.3. Subsequent stock returns and earnings news 
Perhaps the most distinctive implication of our theory is Proposition 3, which states that 
the expected return to shorting after a good earnings surprise for a previously highly-shorted 
stock is higher than for other stocks.  We want to measure how returns after the earnings 
announcement date differ between highly shorted stocks and little shorted stocks.  In essence, we 
                                                 
14 These findings control for level differences in turnover between highly shorted stocks and other stocks.  
Consistent with our model, highly shorted stocks (HISR) have higher turnover than other stocks; however, this could 
also be consistent with other asset pricing models without our effects.  So, our findings are independent of these 
level differences.  Rather, we are measuring differences in sensitivities to the size of absolute earnings surprises. 
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want to verify that if the CAR results are due to the short covering mechanism we propose, then 
we should see returns to shorting being higher after a good earnings announcement.  As we 
explained in the theory section, the only caveat in testing Proposition 3 is that there is a well-
documented post-earnings announcement drift in the data; i.e., stocks with good (bad) news 
continue to drift in the direction of the news after the announcement.  This drift is outside the 
scope of our model.   
Our analysis proceeds in a manner similar to that of the specification of Table 2; the 
results are presented in Table 4.  In other words, Table 4 is the equivalent of Table 2 except that 
the dependent variable is POSTCAR (from 2 trading days after to 126 trading days after the 
announcement) instead of CAR.  Columns 1-3 show the standard OLS results.  Column (1) 
suggests that having high UE raises POSTCAR by about 0.65 percentage points; this is consistent 
with post-earnings announcement drift.  Column (2) shows that for little shorted stocks, the 
effect of having high unexpected earnings raises POSTCAR by 1.57 percentage points.  
However, the effect of having high UE for highly shorted stocks is much lower.  3  is negative 
and statistically significant (-2.67 percentage points with a t-statistic of about 5.3).  So the overall 
effect of having high UE for highly shorted stocks is the sum of 1.57 and -2.67 or -1.10 
percentage points.  This sum is statistically different from zero with a p-value of 0.01.  For 
highly shorted stocks, having high unexpected earnings actually leads to negative subsequent 
returns of about minus 110 basis points.  In other words, one would want to sell rather than buy 
these good news stocks. The result in column (3) using more elaborate controls confirms the 
result in column (2); the coefficient 3  is smaller at -1.90, but is still statistically significant.   
In columns 4-6, we present the results including stock fixed effects in the specification.  
Column (5) shows that for little shorted stocks, the effect of having high UE raises POSTCAR by 
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0.82 percentage points.  3  is negative and statistically significant (-2.06 percentage points with 
a t-statistic of about 4.1).  So the overall effect of having high UE for highly shorted stocks is the 
sum of 0.82 and -2.06 or -1.24 percentage points.  This sum is again statistically different from 
zero with a p-value of 0.00.  The result in column (6) using more elaborate controls confirms the 
one in column (5); again, the coefficient 3  is smaller at -1.25, but is still statistically 
significant.   
The results including quarter by industry effects in the regression specification (presented 
in columns 7-9) are again similar to those presented in columns 1-3 (baseline) and 4-6 (including 
stock fixed effects).  Column (8) shows that for little shorted stocks, the effect of having high UE 
raises POSTCAR by 1.65 percentage points.  3  is negative and statistically significant (-2.52 
percentage points with a t-statistic of about 5.1).  The overall effect of having high unexpected 
earnings for highly shorted stocks is -0.87 percentage points.  The p-value of the test that the 
effect is different from zero is 0.04.  The results, taken in totality, are consistent with the third 
prediction of our model.   
 
4.4.  Asymmetries 
Following the discussion at the end of the section describing the Model, we now examine 
whether there are different sensitivities to very good versus very bad news for CAR, ABNTURN 
and POSTCAR.  We expect to find that our POSTCAR results should come largely from 
unexpected good news; whereas, the CAR and ABNTURN results may come from both 
unexpected good and bad news.  We slightly alter our empirical specification to measure these 
different reactions to news: 
 
27 
 
tittiti
tititi
titititi
titititititi
dummiesQUARTERdummiesEXCHANGEdummiesINDUSTRY
dummiesVOLATILITYdummyCONVDEBTdummiesNTDISAGREEME
dummiesEPdummiesSIZEHISRUELOW
UELOWHISRUEHIGHHISRUEHIGHCAR
,,,
,,,
,,,,5
,4,,3,2,1,
/







 (13) 
 
where UELOW equals one if a firm’s earnings surprise is in the bottom 33% of the earnings 
surprise distribution for stocks in our sample for that quarter and zero otherwise.  All the other 
variables are defined as above.  The relative magnitudes of 3 and 5 measure the difference in 
the response to good and bad news. 
 The results are presented in Table 5. For brevity, we only show the regression 
specification estimated with stock fixed effects; the results for the baseline estimates and quarter 
by industry effects are qualitatively similar.  Column (1) shows the estimate of equation (13) 
with CAR as the dependent variable.   The coefficient for the interaction of UEHIGH and HISR is 
0.46, similar to before.  The coefficient on the interaction of UELOW and HISR is -0.55 (note 
that it should be negative because bad news leads to a lower CAR).  The absolute values of these 
two coefficients on the two interactions are similar.15  So there is not much evidence of an 
asymmetric response to news in CAR.   
Column (2) shows the results with ABNTURN as the dependent variable.  The coefficient 
on interaction of UEHIGH and HISR is 0.078, while the coefficient on interaction of UELOW 
and HISR is 0.090.  Again, these two coefficients are similar in magnitude.  These two results are 
consistent with the model’s assumption that arbitrageurs can short more when their short position 
becomes more profitable on bad news.   
                                                 
15 The hypothesis that the absolute values of these two coefficients are equal cannot be rejected statistically. 
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Finally, column (3) shows the result when the dependent variable is POSTCAR.  Here, 
the coefficient for the interaction of UEHIGH and HISR is -2.21, while the coefficient for the 
interaction of UELOW and HISR is -.23. The interaction of HISR with UEHIGH is negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that there is large reversion for highly shorted stocks after a 
positive earnings shock.  But the interaction on HISR and UELOW is close to zero, suggesting 
there is no reversion after bad news.  We can reject the hypothesis that 053   in column (3) 
with a p-value of 0.05.  Hence, the results in Table 5 support the predictions of the model. 
 
4.5. Alternative explanations 
We now consider a number of alternative explanations for these three sets of findings.  
There are two closely related alternatives that can explain our main finding regarding high short 
ratio stocks having higher price sensitivity to news.  The first is that high short ratio is a proxy 
for stocks with high divergence of opinion.  Hence, earnings news leads to more price discovery.  
We try to control for this alternative story using explicit proxies for divergence of opinion such 
as analyst forecast disagreement and other controls such as stock fixed effects.  But one might 
still argue that a high short ratio is itself the best proxy.  This alternative, however, does not 
naturally generate a predicted reversal associated with the price reaction.  For high short ratio 
stocks, good news leads to a bigger price move up and subsequent reversal captured by the fact 
that shorting profitability after the event date increases with better news.  A price discovery story 
would naturally imply that certain groups were right and certain groups were wrong and the bets 
are resolved through the earnings news, saying nothing about future returns associated with the 
news. 
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A closely related variant of this divergence of opinion story is that funds that short are 
informed and are betting that there is bad news about the company.  That is, high short interest 
predicts a negative earnings surprise.  When the news is good, this means that the informed 
short-sellers happen to be wrong.  As before, price adjusts appropriately but with no implications 
for POSTCAR.   
Again, we cannot rule out every alternative explanation of our results, but we feel that 
our three sets of findings do cut strongly against a number of reasonable alternatives, particularly 
when one takes into account the stock fixed effects and quarter by industry effects 
specifications.16 
 
4.6. Quasi-experiment 1: NASDAQ versus NYSE 
It is worthwhile to think of additional ways to identify our amplification mechanism.  We 
now examine a couple of quasi-experiments.  For our first one, we exploit differences in short 
selling regulations across stock exchanges.  SEC reforms after July 2007 removed constraints on 
short selling on any U.S. exchange, but for a large part of our sample, short selling regulations 
were more lax for stocks listed on NASDAQ than on the NYSE.  Before 1994, there were no 
short selling regulations for NASDAQ stocks; starting in 1994, NASDAQ introduced some 
degree of regulation to compete with the NYSE/AMEX for firm listings because companies 
typically do not like to have their stocks shorted.  The two exchanges used somewhat different 
price tests (NYSE/AMEX used the tick test that is generally thought to be more stringent than 
the bid test used by NASDAQ). In total, the NASDAQ regulations that were introduced were 
                                                 
16 Note that our results are not simply due just to a short squeeze since we are looking at sensitivities to unexpected 
earnings surprises (though issues in locating shares after unexpected good news might contribute to our 
amplification findings). 
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substantially weaker than those of the NYSE/AMEX.17  However, the move to decimalization in 
early 2001 likely made the tick test a much less binding constraint.  To be conservative from an 
identification perspective, we consider the sample period before 2001 and examine whether our 
destabilization effects are stronger among NASDAQ stocks than NYSE/AMEX stocks. 
To begin with, we expect to find that, all else equal, short interest ratios are substantially 
higher for NASDAQ stocks during this period.  In particular, in unreported results, we examine 
whether being listed on NASDAQ increases the likelihood that the stock is in the top 33% of the 
short ratio distribution for stocks in our sample using the following regression: 
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The coefficient of interest is 1 , which measures how being listed on NASDAQ affects the 
probability that the stock is in the top 33% of the short ratio distribution.18  Consistent with our 
premise, being a NASDAQ stock increases the probability that a stock is in the top 33% of the 
short ratio distribution by about 7.9 percentage points.  The t-statistic of the coefficient is about 
6.6. 
In Table 6, we then show whether our estimates established in Tables 2-4 are stronger 
among NASDAQ stocks than NYSE/AMEX stocks.  To this end, we adopt the same 
                                                 
17 First, NASDAQ exempted its market-makers from short selling regulations.  Second, trades originating from 
Electronic Communications Networks (ECNs) were also exempt.  This means that 30% of NASDAQ short sale 
trades were not even subject to a bid test; whereas, all NYSE/AMEX trades are subject to a tick test (see, e.g., 
Jickling (2005), O’Hara and Angstadt (2004)). 
18 We have also run this as a probit or logit and obtained similar results. 
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specifications as in Tables 2-4 (column (2)) except that, as with the previous quasi-experiment, 
we use a sample that includes all stocks in the top and bottom 33% of the short ratio distribution 
for stocks in our sample for the quarter and exchange and the top and bottom 33% of the 
unexpected earnings distribution for stocks in our sample for the quarter and exchange.19  We 
also include additional explanatory variables including an indicator for being listed on NASDAQ, 
UEHIGH NASDAQ, HISR NASDAQ and the main variable of interest, 
UEHIGH HISR NASDAQ.   
Column (1) reports the results for CAR; the coefficient on the triple interaction is about 
1.40 with a t-statistic of about 3.3.   In other words, the higher sensitivity of CAR to earnings 
shocks for highly shorted stocks compared to other stocks is larger among NASDAQ stocks than 
NYSE/AMEX stocks.  Column (2) reports the results for ABNTURN.  The coefficient on the 
triple interaction is small and imprecisely measured, but it has the hypothesized sign.  So, there is 
weak evidence that the sensitivity of abnormal turnover to news for high short interest stocks 
compared to other stocks is slightly larger among NASDAQ stocks than NYSE/AMEX stocks.  
Column (3) reports the results for POSTCAR.  The triple interaction coefficient for POSTCAR is 
-4.93 with a t-statistic of about 2.6; the POSTCAR reversal results are indeed larger for 
NASDAQ stocks than NYSE/AMEX stocks.  Again, the results in Table 6 broadly support the 
implications of our model. 
 
4.7.  Quasi-experiment 2:  The rise of hedge funds 
Our second quasi-experiment builds on the work of Hanson and Sunderam (2008) who 
show a substantial increase since the early 2000s in short ratios concentrated among small stocks 
(NYSE deciles 1-5).  They argue that this is in large part due to the rise of hedge funds; Hedge 
                                                 
19 This starker comparison of extreme observations helps a bit with economic significance and statistical precision. 
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Fund Research reports that assets managed by long-short equity hedge funds, among the most 
sophisticated arbitrageurs, grew from $133 billion in 2000 to $409 billion at the end of 2006.  
Hanson and Sunderam further report that by some estimates, hedge funds account for 85% of 
short positions in the US equity market.  As a result, the percentage of US equity market 
capitalization sold short nearly doubled from 1.7% in 2000 to 3.0% in 2007.   
Most interestingly to us is that this growth has been concentrated in small stocks.  In 
Figure 1, we verify Hanson and Sunderam’s finding by plotting the average short ratio over time 
for two groups: small stocks, which are defined as all stocks (no matter what exchange they are 
listed on) with a market capitalization that would put it them in the bottom half of the market 
capitalization of NYSE stocks, and large stocks, which are defined as stocks with a market 
capitalization that would put them in the 8th through top decile of the market capitalization of 
NYSE stocks (no matter what exchange they are listed on).  We exclude stocks in NYSE deciles 
6-7 since these stocks are in between in the sense that they experienced some moderate growth in 
short ratios. We see from Figure 1 that the short ratio of large stocks has not increased by much 
over our sample period.  It starts at 1% in 1994 and increases to around 2% in 1998 and since 
then it has fluctuated between 2% and 3%.  In contrast, we see a very steep increase in the short 
ratio among small stocks starting around 2002 from around 2% in 2000 to a high of 9% in 2007.  
 If our hypothesis is correct, then we expect to find that the destabilizing effects shown 
above ought to have increased among small stocks since 2002 relative to large stocks.  We find 
some suggestive evidence that this is indeed the case in Table 7.  We estimate an augmented 
version of our specifications in Tables 2 through 4 separately for small and large stocks, 
expanding the list of independent variables with an indicator AFTER2001 (a dummy variable 
that turns on if the observation is after 2001), UEHIGH AFTER2001 and 
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UEHIGH HISR AFTER2001.    The coefficient of interest is for the triple interaction of 
UEHIGH HISR AFTER2001.  This coefficient tells us whether our destabilization effects are 
stronger after 2001 than before.  Also, we again use a sample that includes stocks only in the top 
and bottom 33% of the short ratio distribution for stocks in our sample for the quarter and 
exchange and the top and bottom 33% of the unexpected earnings distribution for stocks in our 
sample for the quarter and exchange. 
We find that for the most part, the magnitudes of the coefficients on the triple interactions 
are consistent with our hypothesis, although the precision of the estimates is poor.  Column (1) 
reports the results for CAR for small stocks.  The coefficient for the triple interaction term 
UEHIGH HISR AFTER2001 is 0.38 with a t-statistic of about 0.79.  In other words, among 
small stocks, the higher sensitivity of CAR to the earnings shock for highly shorted stocks 
compared to other stocks is somewhat larger after 2001 compared to the earlier period.  Column 
(2) shows the same estimate using the sample of large stocks.  The coefficient on the triple 
interaction is -.48, indicating that the sensitivity of CAR to unexpected earnings for highly 
shorted stocks compared to others is somewhat declining later in the sample.  Although these 
coefficients are imprecise, their magnitudes suggest that the sensitivity of highly shorted small 
stocks to UE is growing over time relative to large stocks, consistent with our story. 
  Column (3) reports the results for ABNTURN for the sample of small stocks.  The triple 
interaction coefficient is 0.109.  The similar coefficient for large stocks reported in column (4) is 
0.139.  This suggests that the sensitivity of turnover to earnings shocks for highly shorted stocks 
compared to other stocks is growing slightly more after 2001 for large stocks compared to small 
stocks.  Although this is not consistent with our story, the difference in the magnitudes of the 
coefficients is very small and not statistically significant.   
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Column (5) reports the results for POSTCAR for the small stock sample. The triple 
interaction coefficient is -.33 with a t-stat of about 0.16, suggesting that, among small stocks, the 
POSTCAR reversal result is somewhat stronger after 2001 than before.  The similar coefficient 
for the large stock sample is presented in column (6); it is 0.61, indicating that the increase in 
sensitivity after 2001, like the CAR results, is bigger for the small stock sample than the large 
stock sample.   
These results of this quasi-experiment are roughly consistent with the joint hypothesis 
that our effects are driven by limits to arbitrage and that such limits bind more strongly for 
smaller stocks.  Interestingly, the increase in the difference of sensitivities of small and large 
stocks after 2001 is similar in absolute value for the CAR and POSTCAR estimates.  The results 
are very imprecise, but overall we conclude that the results in Table 7 are broadly supportive of 
our model. 
 
4.8. Robustness checks and additional analyses 
Finally, we have carried out a number of additional robustness checks of our analysis.  
The results are not presented here; they are available in a web appendix.20  
 
5. Conclusion 
 We develop a simple model based on Shleifer and Vishny (1997) to examine whether 
arbitrageurs amplify fundamental shocks in the context of short arbitrage in equity markets.  The 
key amplifying mechanism is that the ability of arbitrageurs to hold on to short positions depends 
on asset values: shorts are often cut following good news about a stock.  The extra buying 
pressure from this short covering temporarily boosts the stock price.  As a result, the prices of 
                                                 
20 The web appendix can be accessed at www.princeton.edu/~hhong. 
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highly shorted stocks over-shoot (and hence are excessively sensitive to fundamental shocks) but 
eventually revert back in the long run. 
Consistent with this model, we find that, controlling for a host of other stock 
characteristics, the price of a highly shorted stock is more sensitive to earnings news than a stock 
with little short interest.  Moreover, using daily share turnover as a proxy for short covering, we 
show that short interest changes in the predicted direction in response to earnings news.  For 
highly shorted stocks, returns to shorting are actually higher following good earnings news.  
Finally, these differential sensitivities are more pronounced for NASDAQ stocks, which are 
easier to short than NYSE stocks, and these effects have become more pronounced over time for 
small stocks with the rise of hedge funds.  These findings are broadly consistent with theories 
that emphasize the limits of arbitrage in affecting asset price dynamics.  
As we suggested in the Introduction, understanding the potentially destabilizing effects of 
speculators on asset markets is of paramount importance in light of the rise of hedge funds in the 
last decade and the recent turmoil in financial markets.  There are a number of avenues for 
further research to clarify the various channels through which speculators might destabilize 
markets.  Along the same lines as this paper, if better daily data on short trades becomes 
available, we can more directly verify the short covering effect around earnings announcements 
as opposed to simply using share turnover.  We can also use options data as opposed to short 
interest data to measure levered long or short positions in stocks and perform a similar set of 
analyses as in this paper.  Finally, empirical work on the destabilizing potential of quantitative 
strategies more generally would be very valuable.  We plan to pursue these avenues in future 
research. 
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Appendix 
In this appendix we relax our earlier assumption that speculators put all their resources, 
0F , at risk in the stock market immediately, and instead assume that they choose some amount, 
00 FD   to put at risk (the remainder is invested in cash and yields a zero net return).  The 
speculators may want to put some money aside in case the stock becomes an even better short 
trade after the earnings announcement.  To complete the model, we set up the speculators’ 
incentives and solve their optimization problem.  We set the problem up in terms of speculators 
maximizing wealth at the liquidation date.  Because speculators are fully invested at time 1, 
profits from time 0 to 1 are already factored into this maximization.  Hence speculators 
maximize the expectation of      


 
01
010 2 Dp
vDFDR  with respect to 0D : 
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Taking the first derivative with respect to 0D  above and substituting 1F  from (5) gives us the 
following FOC: 
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If the FOC is strictly greater than 0 then 00 FD  .  For 00 FD   to be optimal the FOC must be 
equal to 0.  Each term in (A2) represents the incremental gross return following either a positive 
or a negative fundamental value announcement, accounting for the returns accumulated at both 
period 1 and period 2.  The optimization condition (A2) and the price equations define the 
equilibrium of this model. 
We will make use of the following rearrangement of terms for the earnings-response-
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coefficient for the proofs below 
       ,1 00 




vEv
DFSvSkv    (A3) 
where    11 1
0
0  pDak   and  1k   for stocks with nonzero initial short ratio  000 pD  .  All the 
propositions below assume that there is not enough capital to bring prices close to fundamental 
value. 
  
Proof of Proposition 1:  Note that the definition for    can be written as 
 
][
01
vEv
ppv 
     (A4) 
We will assume that sentiment  S   and   vS   are raised uniformly for the shorted stock (for 
which  DD00 , where D  is defined below) over the little shorted stock ( 00 D ) so that 
  SvS   does not change. 
In order for the proposition to hold, speculators must be subject to capital constraints; i.e.,  
0a .  When 0a , the initial decision regarding  0D   is made independently of the wealth 
maximization problem of period 1.  Hence 0D  will be chosen equal to F0  to maximize period 1 
profits.  Along with the fact that    11 1
0
0  pDak  , this implies that (A3) for 0a   can be 
simplified to 
      .1 




vEv
SvSv     (A5) 
Because   SvS  , and v  are the same for the shorted and little shorted stock, all terms in (A5) 
are equal, and so the betas are equal. 
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Now return to the case of 0a .  First, we demonstrate that the partial derivative of   
with respect to D0  at the point 000  FD  is greater than zero.  Hence   is increasing for small 
D0 .  From (A3),   consists of the product of two positive terms, k  and       vEv DFSvS   001 .  It is 
straightforward to show that  0
0
Dk   at  00 D .  To prove that  00 D , it is only necessary to 
show that the derivative of the second term is nonnegative.  Since the first order condition is 
continuous in  D0   and is positive for  00 D , it must be the case that  00 FD    even for small  
00 D .  Hence 100 DF , and the derivative of the second term is zero. 
So far we have shown that     is larger for positive short interest stocks so long as  D0   
is small.  Since  
0D
k

   is always positive, changes in the sign of  
0D
   must come from changes 
in  
0
0
D
F

  .  From the first order condition, we notice that as  D0   and  F0   increase, there will 
eventually come a point where  1
0
0 DF  , and at this point  0D   decreases and may eventually 
turn negative (we will see momentarily that it must turn negative).  From all the equations 
involved, notice that this is the only possible source of change in the sign of  
0D
  .  Finally, 
consider what happens for very large  D0   and  F0 .  In such a case, price equals fundamental 
value and  1  .  Hence there must exist  D , and so too  F , such that the proposition holds 
whenever initial capital is below  F . 
 
 Proof of Proposition 2: Intuitively, a positive (negative) earnings shock and resultant increase 
(decrease) in price cuts into (adds to) the speculator's selling power, implying a lower (higher) 
short ratio in the following period.  A speculator subject to collateral constraints and/or 
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performance based fund flow would also lose (gain) some collateral, inducing him to reduce 
(expand) his short position further.  Now examine this statement algebraically.  The initial short 
ratio is  
0
0
p
D   and the post-announcement short ratio is  
1
1
p
F  .  Consider the effect of positive news,  
  0 vEv  .  The change in price,  01 pp   , is      01 DSvEFvSv   .  This expression 
is the sum of the change in fundamental value,   vEv   , and the change in unarbitraged 
sentiment,     01 DSFvS   .  So long as the positive earnings news does not perversely 
cause the un-arbitraged sentiment to decrease, both terms are positive and the change in price is 
proportional to the earnings surprise.  Now provided there is not enough capital to bring prices 
close to fundamental value in the sense of Proposition 1,  D0   is near  F0  , and  01 DF  .  
Therefore the short ratio changes inversely with the earnings surprise. 
To show the statement regarding share turnover, note that the only traders in our model 
are noise traders and speculators.  Hence aggregate share turnover is proportional to the (absolute 
value of) change in demand of either type of trader.  As we've seen above, the speculator's 
demand is equal to the current short ratio, so turnover is exactly equal to the (absolute) change in 
short ratio. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: The expected return to shorting in our model is the ratio of price to 
fundamental value.  Before and after a positive earnings surprise, this ratio is   vEp0   and   vvp1  , 
respectively.  Of course, for   vEv    (i.e. no earnings news), the expected return to shorting 
does not change.  Hence our proposition is equivalent to    11 vd vdp  .  Our assumption that 
sentiment increases proportionally with unexpected earnings news is interpreted as    0 vS  .  
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From (8),      vSkvd vdp  11  .  To prove the proposition, note that  1k   for highly shorted 
stocks. 
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics 
 Mean 25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Short Ratio (% of shares outstanding) 3.44 
[4.80] 
.60 1.75 4.34 
ABNTURN (mean abnormal turnover (%) 
from trading day -1 to +1) 
.00 
[1.40] 
-.42 -.11 .17 
CAR (cumulative abnormal return (%) 
from trading day -1 to +1) 
.11 
[8.22] 
-3.28 .12 3.73 
POSTCAR (cumulative abnormal return 
from trading day +2 to +126) 
-1.61 
[31.41] 
-16.25 -.93 13.88 
Unexpected Earnings (as a % of previous 
price) 
-.10 
[1.00] 
-.09 .01 .12 
Market Capitalization (millions of dollars) 3891 
[16,243] 
249 639 2018 
Price/Earnings (if positive) 39.7 
[157.2] 
14.0 19.2 29.4 
Analyst Disagreement .17 
[.65] 
.02 .05 .13 
Past Volatility .12 
[.08] 
.07 .10 .14 
Convertible Debt (millions of dollars) 34.0 
[170.1] 
0 0 0 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of the sample used in the regression estimations.  The sample 
includes all stocks that are traded either on NYSE/AMEX or NASDAQ from 1994-2007 for which we 
have short interest, I/B/E/S, CRSP and Compustat data.  Standard deviations are in brackets.  There are 
119,785 observations. 
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Table 2:  OLS Estimates of the Sensitivity of Stock Returns to Unexpected Earnings
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Indicator for High Unexpected 
Earnings (UEHIGH) 
3.46 
(.06) 
3.27 
(.07) 
  3.75 
(.07) 
3.48 
(.07) 
  3.50 
(.06) 
3.31 
(.07) 
 
Indicator for High Short Ratio 
(HISR) 
-.09 
(.06) 
-.27 
(.07) 
-.17 
(.07) 
 -.16 
(.08) 
-.41 
(.09) 
-.31 
(.09) 
 -.09 
(.06) 
-.27 
(.07) 
-.17 
(.07) 
 High Unexpected Earnings High 
Short Ratio (UEHIGH HISR) 
 .55 
(.12) 
.33 
(.13) 
  .79 
(.13) 
.56 
(.14) 
  .53 
(.13) 
.30 
(.13) 
Stock Fixed Effects No No No  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Industry Effects No No No  No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 .042 .043 .047  .129 .129 .133  .073 .074 .078 
 
The dependent variable is CAR (cumulative abnormal return (%) from trading day -1 to +1).  The independent variables include 
UEHIGH (indicator that a stock’s earnings surprise for the quarter is in the top 33% of the sample distribution that quarter), HISR (a 
dummy equal to one if the stock is in the top 33% of the sample short ratio distribution for the quarter of the observation and zero 
otherwise), SIZE (25 dummy variables measuring where a stock’s relative market cap is each quarter), P/E (price-to-earnings divided 
into 25 dummies by quarter and one additional dummy variable for negative earnings stocks), DISAGREEMENT (analyst 
disagreement divided into 25 dummies calculated each quarter), CONVDEBT (a dummy for the firm having positive convertible 
debt), VOLATILITY (past volatility divided into 25 dummies calculated each quarter), INDUSTRY dummies (SIC at the 2 digit 
level), EXCHANGE dummies and QUARTER dummies.  In columns (3), (6) and (9), interactions of UEHIGH and all of the other 
controls except the INDUSTRY, EXCHANGE and QUARTER dummies are included in the specification.  The standard errors (in 
parentheses) are adjusted by allowing for the errors to be correlated across observations of the same stock; i.e. the standard errors are 
clustered by stock.  There are 119,785 observations. 
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Table 3:  OLS Estimates of the Sensitivity of Abnormal Turnover to Unexpected Earnings
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
High Absolute Unexpected Earnings 
(ABSUEHIGH) 
.130 
(.010) 
.104 
(.009) 
  .130 
(.011) 
.090 
(.010) 
  .127 
(.010) 
.104 
(.009) 
 
Indicator for High Short Ratio 
(HISR) 
.231 
(.011) 
.206 
(.012) 
.201 
(.012) 
 .392 
(.016) 
.355 
(.016) 
.354 
(.016) 
 .228 
(.011) 
.206 
(.013) 
.200 
(.012) 
High Absolute Unexpected Earnings 
Decile High Short Ratio 
(ABSUEHIGH HISR) 
 .075 
(.023) 
.087 
(.022) 
  .111 
(.026) 
.112 
(.026) 
  .065 
(.023) 
.081 
(.022) 
Stock Fixed Effects No No No  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Industry Effects No No No  No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 .065 .065 .067  .112 .112 .114  .100 .100 .102 
 
The dependent variable is ABNTURN (mean abnormal turnover (%) from trading day -1 to +1).  The independent variables include 
ABSUEHIGH (indicator that a stock’s absolute earnings surprise for the quarter is in the top 33% of the sample distribution that 
quarter), HISR (a dummy equal to one if the stock is in the top 33% of the sample short ratio distribution for the quarter of the 
observation and zero otherwise), SIZE (25 dummy variables measuring where a stock’s relative market cap is each quarter), P/E 
(price-to-earnings divided into 25 dummies calculated each quarter and one additional dummy variable for negative earnings stocks), 
DISAGREEMENT (analyst disagreement divided into 25 dummies calculated each quarter), CONVDEBT (a dummy for the firm 
having positive convertible debt), VOLATILITY (past volatility divided into 25 dummies calculated each quarter),  INDUSTRY 
dummies (SIC at the 2 digit level), EXCHANGE dummies and QUARTER dummies.  In columns (3), (6) and (9), interactions of 
ABSUEHIGH and all of the other controls except the INDUSTRY, EXCHANGE and QUARTER dummies are included in the 
specification.  The standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted by allowing for the errors to be correlated across observations of the 
same stock; i.e. the standard errors are clustered by stock.  There are 119,785 observations. 
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Table 4:  OLS Estimates of the Effect of Unexpected Earnings on Subsequent Stock Returns
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Indicator for High Unexpected 
Earnings (UEHIGH) 
.65 
(.23) 
1.57 
(.25) 
  .11 
(.23) 
.82 
(.25) 
  .78 
(.22) 
1.65 
(.25) 
 
Indicator for High Short Ratio 
(HISR) 
-1.37 
(.28) 
-.51 
(.31) 
-.77 
(.31) 
 -2.44 
(.35) 
-1.78 
(.38) 
-2.05 
(.38) 
 -1.49 
(.27) 
-.67 
(.30) 
-.92 
(.31) 
 High Unexpected Earnings High 
Short Ratio (UEHIGH HISR) 
 -2.67 
(.50) 
-1.90 
(.53) 
  -2.06 
(.50) 
-1.25 
(.52) 
  -2.52 
(.49) 
-1.80 
(.51) 
Stock Fixed Effects No No No  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Industry Effects No No No  No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 .020 .022 .024  .216 .214 .218  .123 .123 .125 
            
p-value of test that 031    0.01    0.00    0.04  
 
The dependent variable is POSTCAR (cumulative abnormal return (%) from trading day +2 to +126).  The independent variables 
include UEHIGH (indicator that a stock’s earnings surprise for the quarter is in the top 33% of the sample distribution that quarter), 
HISR (a dummy equal to one if the stock is in the top 33% of the sample short ratio distribution for the quarter of the observation and 
zero otherwise), SIZE (25 dummy variables measuring where a stock’s relative market cap is each quarter), P/E (price-to-earnings 
divided into 25 dummies calculated each quarter and one additional dummy variable for negative earnings stocks), DISAGREEMENT 
(analyst disagreement divided into 25 dummies calculated each quarter), CONVDEBT (a dummy for the firm having positive 
convertible debt), VOLATILITY (past volatility divided into 25 dummies calculated quarter), INDUSTRY dummies (SIC at the 2 
digit level), EXCHANGE dummies and QUARTER dummies.  In columns (3), (6) and (9), interactions of UEHIGH and all of the 
other controls except the INDUSTRY, EXCHANGE and QUARTER dummies are included in the specification.  The standard errors 
(in parentheses) are adjusted by allowing for the errors to be correlated across observations of the same stock; i.e. the standard errors 
are clustered by stock.  There are 119,785 observations. 
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Table 5:  OLS Estimates of the Differential Effect of High and Low Unexpected Earnings 
on Returns and Turnover
 CAR ABNTURN POSTCAR 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Indicator for High Unexpected 
Earnings (UEHIGH) 
2.33 
(.08) 
.055 
(.009) 
.49 
(.29) 
Indicator for Low Unexpected 
Earnings (UELOW) 
-1.84 
(.07) 
.093 
(.009) 
-.53 
(.28) 
 Indicator for High Short Ratio 
(HISR) 
-.07 
(.11) 
.333 
(.028) 
-1.62 
(.47) 
High Unexpected Earnings High 
Short Ratio (UEHIGH HISR) 
.46 
(.14) 
.078 
(.038) 
-2.21 
(.57) 
Low Unexpected Earnings High 
Short Ratio (UELOW HISR) 
-.55 
(.14) 
.090 
(.043) 
-.23 
(.55) 
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 .137 .112 .216 
 
The dependent variable in column (1) is CAR (cumulative abnormal return (%) from trading day 
-1 to +1).  The dependent variable in column (2) is ABNTURN (mean abnormal turnover (%) 
from trading day -1 to +1).  The dependent variable in column (3) is POSTCAR (cumulative 
abnormal return (%) from trading day +2 to +126).  The independent variables include UEHIGH 
(indicator that a stock’s earnings surprise for the quarter is in the top 33% of the sample 
distribution that quarter), UELOW (indicator that a stock’s earnings surprise for the quarter is in 
the bottom 33% of the sample distribution that quarter), HISR (a dummy equal to one if the stock 
is in the top 33% of the sample short ratio distribution for the quarter of the observation and zero 
otherwise), SIZE (25 dummy variables measuring where a stock’s relative market cap is each 
quarter), P/E (price-to-earnings divided into 25 dummies calculated each quarter and one 
additional dummy variable for negative earnings stocks), DISAGREEMENT (analyst 
disagreement divided into 25 dummies calculated each quarter), CONVDEBT (a dummy for the 
firm having positive convertible debt), VOLATILITY (past volatility divided into 25 dummies 
calculated each quarter), INDUSTRY dummies (SIC at the 2 digit level), EXCHANGE dummies 
and QUARTER dummies.  The standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted by allowing for the 
errors to be correlated across observations of the same stock; i.e. the standard errors are clustered 
by stock.  There are 119,785 observations. 
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Table 6:  Estimates of the Effect of Unexpected Earnings on Stock Returns, Turnover and 
Subsequent Stock Returns for NASDAQ versus NYSE Stocks 
 CAR ABNTURN POSTCAR 
 (1) (2) (3) 
High Unexpected Earnings (UEHIGH 
or ABSUEHIGH for column 2) 
3.04 
(.16) 
.188 
(.021) 
3.32 
(.70) 
Indicator for High Short Ratio(HISR) .08 
(.18) 
.009 
(.022) 
-.44 
(.88) 
Indicator for NASDAQ stock 
(NASDAQ) 
-.36 
(.20) 
.034 
(.024) 
3.00 
(.97) 
UEHIGH HISR -.18 
(.25) 
.029 
(.032) 
-1.64 
(1.06) 
UEHIGH NASDAQ .80 
(.26) 
-.069 
(.029) 
2.26 
(1.16) 
HISR NASDAQ -.99 
(.31) 
-.023 
(.037) 
.18 
(1.42) 
UEHIGH HISR NASDAQ 1.40 
(.43) 
.012 
(.052) 
-4.93 
(1.90) 
R2 .059 .033 .042 
 
The dependent variable is CAR (cumulative abnormal return (%) from trading day -1 to +1) in 
column (1).  The dependent variable is ABNTURN (mean abnormal turnover from trading day -
1 to +1) in column (2), and the dependent variable is POSTCAR (cumulative abnormal return 
from trading day +2 to +126) in column (3).  The sample includes all stocks in the top and 
bottom 33% of the short ratio distribution for the quarter and exchange and the top and bottom 
33% of the unexpected earnings distribution for the quarter and exchange.  The independent 
variables include UEHIGH (indicator that a stock’s earnings surprise for the quarter is in the top 
33% of the sample distribution that quarter), ABSUEHIGH (indicator that a stock’s absolute 
earnings surprise for the quarter is in the top 33% of the sample distribution that quarter), HISR 
(a dummy equal to one if the stock is in the top 33% of the sample short ratio distribution for the 
quarter and exchange of the observation and zero otherwise), NASDAQ (a dummy equal to one 
if the stock is in NASDAQ), SIZE (25 dummy variables measuring where a stock’s relative 
market cap is each quarter), P/E (price-to-earnings divided into 25 dummies calculated each 
quarter and one additional dummy variable for negative earnings stocks), DISAGREEMENT 
(analyst disagreement divided into 25 dummies calculated each quarter), IO (institutional 
ownership divided into 25 dummies calculated each quarter), CONVDEBT (a dummy for the 
firm having positive convertible debt), VOLATILITY (past volatility divided into 25 dummies 
calculated each quarter), INDUSTRY dummies (SIC at the 2 digit level) and QUARTER 
dummies.  The standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted by allowing for the errors to be 
correlated across observations of the same stock; i.e. the standard errors are clustered by stock.  
The sample period for these regressions is 1993 through 2000.  There are 27,066 observations. 
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Table 7:  Estimates of the Effect of Unexpected Earnings 
on Stock Returns, Turnover and Subsequent Stock Returns for Small and Large Cap Stocks Before and After 2001 
 CAR  ABNTURN  POSTCAR 
 Small Large  Small Large  Small Large 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
High Unexpected Earnings (UEHIGH 
or ABSUEHIGH for columns 3 and 4) 
3.74
(.20)
2.59
(.18)
 .121 
(.026) 
.101
(.023)
 6.77
(.96)
-1.72
(.79)
Indicator for High Short Ratio (HISR) -.85
(.24)
-.34
(.21)
 -.113 
(.044) 
.016
(.026)
 -1.45
(1.18)
-1.11
(.90)
UEHIGH HISR 1.38
(.33)
.64
(.31)
 .125 
(.049) 
-.003
(.044)
 -5.44
(1.59)
-.87
(1.33)
UEHIGH Indicator for After 2001 
(AFTER) 
.66
(.30)
1.26
(.26)
 -.003 
(.036) 
.030
(.036)
 -1.87
(1.28)
3.00
(.94)
HISR AFTER -.55
(.34)
-.08
(.34)
 .363 
(.072) 
.533
(.060)
 .69
(1.54)
.08
(1.24)
UEHIGH HISR AFTER .38
(.48)
-.48
(.48)
 .109 
(.082) 
.139
(.095)
 -.33
(2.11)
.61
(1.75)
R2 .075 .066  .067 .126  .036 .024 
 
The dependent variable is CAR (cumulative abnormal return (%) from trading day -1 to +1) in columns (1) and (2).  The dependent variable is ABNTURN 
(mean abnormal turnover (%) from trading day -1 to +1) in columns (3) and (4), and the dependent variable is POSTCAR (cumulative abnormal return (%) from 
trading day +2 to +126) in columns (5) and (6).  The sample includes all stocks in the top and bottom 33% of the short ratio distribution for the quarter and 
exchange and the top and bottom 33% of the unexpected earnings distribution for the quarter and exchange.  Small stocks are firms with a market cap below the 
40th percentile and large stocks are firms with market cap above 70th percentile.  The independent variables include UEHIGH (the indicator that a stock’s 
earnings surprise for the quarter is in the top 33% of the sample distribution that quarter), ABSUEHIGH (indicator that a stock’s absolute earnings surprise for 
the quarter is in the top 33% of the sample distribution that quarter), HISR (a dummy equal to one if the stock is in the top 33% of the sample short ratio 
distribution for the quarter and exchange of the observation and zero otherwise), AFTER (a dummy equal to one if the observation is after 2001), SIZE (25 
dummy variables measuring where a stock’s relative market cap is each quarter), P/E (price-to-earnings divided into 25 dummies calculated quarter and one 
additional dummy variable for negative earnings stocks), DISAGREEMENT (analyst disagreement divided into 25 dummies calculated each quarter), IO 
(institutional ownership divided into 25 dummies calculated each quarter), CONVDEBT (a dummy for the firm having positive convertible debt), VOLATILITY 
(past volatility divided into 25 dummies calculated each quarter), INDUSTRY dummies (SIC at the 2 digit level) EXCHANGE dummies and QUARTER 
dummies.  The standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted by allowing for the errors to be correlated across observations of the same stock; i.e. the standard 
errors are clustered by stock.  There are 24,781 observations for the small stock models in columns (1), (3) and (5), and  17,274 observations for the large stock 
models in column (2), (4) and (6). 
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Figure 1:  Plot of Short Interest Ratio Over Time by Firm Size
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